Signing keys
Verdel is designed so that we cannot ship an update to your users on our own. Four roles of signed metadata make that provable.
The four roles
| Role | Signs | Held by | Default validity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Root | Which keys are trusted for the other roles | You, offline | 12 months |
| Targets | The list of release files and their hashes | Your CI or HSM | 90 days |
| Snapshot | The current version of every metadata file | Verdel signing service | 7 days |
| Timestamp | That the snapshot is current | Verdel signing service | 24 hours |
The snapshot and timestamp keys prove freshness, not authenticity. If Verdel's systems were compromised, an attacker could stall updates or replay old ones within the validity window, but could not make a device install a file you did not sign with the targets key.
Rotation
Rotate the targets key every 12 months, or immediately after any suspected exposure:
verdel keys rotate targets --new ./keys/targets-2027.ed25519 # root.json v2 signed with the offline root key # old targets key accepted until 2027-12-04 (grace 30 days)
Rotating the root key requires that devices can already verify the new root against the old one. Agent 4.9 and later follow root rotations automatically; older agents need a full installer that carries the new root.
Hardware-backed signing
Since 24 March 2026, Fleet and Enterprise workspaces can sign with a PKCS#11 hardware module or a cloud HSM. Configure the module in verdel.toml; the CLI sends only the digest to be signed.
[signing] provider = "pkcs11" module = "/usr/lib/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so" slot = 2 label = "acme-targets"
Platform code signing
Manifest signatures are separate from Authenticode, notarization and package signing. Verdel can upload your already signed installers unchanged, and Fleet workspaces can run notarization as a pipeline step with credentials kept in your own secret store.
Report a suspected key exposure at once to security@nl5.enotcloud.com. We can freeze every release in your workspace in under two minutes.